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NCAA v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
OKLAHOMA: HAS THE SUPREME COURT
ABROGATED THE PER SE RULE OF
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS?
I. INTRODUCTION
For years, avid college football fans have been deprived of watching
their favorite local team compete live on television because another
game, of greater national interest, was being televised by the networks
who owned the exclusive rights to broadcast National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA)1 football. However, college football fans may no
longer have to stay up late to watch the television replays since the
United States Supreme Court's decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents of
the University of Oklahoma.2
In Board of Regents, two member institutions of the NCAA, the
Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia, challenged the NCAA's restric-
tive television plan,3 claiming that it violated section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act (Sherman Act).4 Although the NCAA television plan had
been challenged previously under section 1 of the Sherman Act,5 Board
of Regents was the first case in which the United States Supreme Court
analyzed the plan in detail. The television plan essentially prohibited
member institutions from individually negotiating their college football
broadcast rights and limited the total amount of televised games in a
season. It also limited the number of appearances any one institution
could make on television.6
The Court held that the NCAA television plan was a violation of
1. The NCAA is a nonprofit organization that plays an important role in the regulation
of amateur collegiate sports. For a complete discussion of the NCAA's regulation of college
football, see infra notes 50-71 and accompanying text.
2. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
3. See infra notes 56-71 and accompanying text for an in-depth discussion of this plan.
4. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
5. See, e-g., Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
Inc., 499 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (court denied motion for preliminary injunction to
restrain television network and the NCAA from preventing cable company telecasts of live
football games not otherwise televised by the network).
6. 104 S. Ct. at 2957. For a complete discussion of the NCAA television plan, see infra
notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
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section 1 of the Sherman Act.7 The Court found that the NCAA plan
was not more efficient than the free market, did not protect live attend-
ance at college football games and did not further the NCAA's stated
policy of maintaining a competitive balance among amateur athletic
teams.' In effect, the Court stated that even though the NCAA is an
unincorporated, nonprofit educational association that promotes a valued
tradition of society, it was not beyond the reach of the antitrust laws and
thus could not institute price and output restrictions on competition.
The major problem with the Board of Regents decision is the type of
antitrust analysis applied by the Supreme Court. By choosing the rule of
reason doctrine to evaluate the price restrictions in the NCAA's televi-
sion plan, the Court continued to erode traditional per se 9 categories
without explaining where this trend should stop.
This Note discusses the problems raised by the Court's rejection of
the per se rule against price fixing and argues that the Board of Regents
decision should be severely limited to avoid judicial confusion and pro-
tracted litigation.
II. THE SHERMAN ACT
The Sherman Act1° was designed to produce and maintain competi-
tion, the lifeblood of a free market economy.I Congress passed the Act
to remedy growing public discontent with combinations of capital and
trusts, which had monopolized major segments of the economy during
the period of accelerated industrial growth following the American Civil
War. 2 Because of the Act's broad language, it has been applied to a
7. 104 S. Ct. at 2971. In reaching this conclusion the Court stated that:
The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of amateur-
ism in college sports .... But consistent with the Sherman Act, the role of the
NCAA must be to preserve a tradition that might otherwise die; rules that restrict
output are hardly consistent with this role. Today we hold.., that by curtailing
output and blunting the ability of member institutions to respond to consumer pref-
erence, the NCAA has restricted rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate
athletics in the Nation's life.
Id. (emphasis in original).
8. Id. at 2967-70.
9. For discussion and definitions of the per se and rule of reason doctrines, see infra notes
16-49 and accompanying text. For the discussion regarding the trend in narrowing the per se
doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 220-38.
10. Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
11. The Supreme Court has stated that the Sherman Act "rests on the premise that the
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while...
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
12. C. HILLS, ANTITRUST ADVISOR § 1.3 (2d ed. 1978). By 1890 these loose-knit combi-
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number of situations not contemplated by the Act's drafters.
1 3
Section 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws concerted activity that re-
strains trade.14 In order to prove a section 1 violation, a plaintiff must
establish three elements regardless of the practice challenged: (1) a con-
spiracy, combination or contract among two or more separate entities
(2) that unreasonably restrains trade and (3) affects foreign or interstate
commerce. 15
nations, or "trusts," existed in the petroleum, tobacco, linseed oil, cotton oil, whiskey, sugar,
salt, cordage, envelope, oilcloth, paving pitch, cast-iron pipe, school-slate and paper industries.
In December of 1889, Senator John Sherman first introduced his antitrust bill, which was later
redrafted, passed by Congress and signed into law by President Benjamin Harrison on July 2,
1890. Id. For an additional discussion of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, see W.
LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA (1965); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY (1964).
13. C. HILLS, supra note 12, § 1.3.
14. Id. § 1.4. Since its adoption by Congress, the Act has been shaped through interpreta-
tion by the courts. This interpretive power stems from the fact that "[t]he legislative history
makes it perfectly clear that... [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the statute's
broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition." National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
In the landmark decision of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), Stan-
dard Oil of Ohio had acquired stock interest in many corporations in order to gain perpetual
control of the movement of petroleum and petroleum products. The Court held that this
practice unreasonably restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act. See infra text accom-
panying notes 42-45. It interpreted § I to be a prohibition against both classes of contracts or
acts which the common law deemed to be undue restraints of trade, and agreements which
new economic times and conditions would make unreasonable. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 59-
60.
The Standard Oil Court, after reviewing the legislative history of the Sherman Act and
common law rules that related to restraints of trade, concluded that Congress did not intend to
prohibit all contracts, or even all contracts which caused attenuated restraints of trade, but to
prohibit only those agreements "which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive condi-
tions." Id. at 58. The principle that § 1 of the Sherman Act is violated only by unreasonable
restraints of trade has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. See, eg., National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-90 (1978); Continental T.V.
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977); Board of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
15. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2d ed. 1984) [here-
inafter cited as ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS].
Since this Note focuses on unreasonable restraints of trade, a brief discussion of the un-
lawful conspiracy and interstate commerce requirements is in order. To establish an unlawful
conspiracy or combination under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the complainant must present evi-
dence that establishes that two or more parties have "knowingly participated in a common
scheme or design." Contractor Util. Sales Co. v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 638 F.2d 1061,
1074 (7th Cir. 1981).
Another essential element of proving a § 1 violation is that the challenged restriction
restrains trade or commerce among the states or with a foreign country. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
To establish this element, the plaintiff must prove that "the defendant['s] activity is itself in
interstate commerce or, if it is local in nature, that it has an effect on some other appreciable
activity demonstrably in interstate commerce." McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 242
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A. The Per Se Rule
There are currently two methods of analysis used to determine
whether a particular act or agreement is an unreasonable restraint of
trade. The first method delineates categories of per se violations. These
include "agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly an-
ticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to estab-
lish their illegality." 16  The most well known per se violation is
horizontal price fixing.17 Typically, this violation occurs when compet-
ing firms at the same level of the market make an arrangement which, in
purpose or effect, inhibits price competition either directly or
indirectly.'"
The first glimpse of ihe per se doctrine came in the late 1890's when
the Supreme Court decided United States v. Joint Traffic Association.'9
In Joint Traffic, an association formed by thirty-one railroad companies
for the purpose of fixing rates, charges and fares, was held to be an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade.2° The Court declared that arrangements
which explicitly and purposefully stifled competition between firms, inde-
pendently operated in the same market, were unlawful. 2 ' The Joint Traf-
fic Court held that the Act established a standard of competition, and
that arrangements such as price fixing are invalid without the need for a
detailed inquiry because they directly and significantly restrict
competition.22
The next important case in the development of the per se doctrine
was United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.23 There, manufacturing cor-
(1980) (citation omitted). Courts have held that the interstate commerce requirement has been
established in a variety of circumstances and thus is not a difficult element for a plaintiff to
prove. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 15, at 26-28. A discussion of re-
straints on trade or commerce with a foreign government is beyond the scope of this Note. See
generally ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 15, Ch. IX.
16. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)
(association's canon of ethics prohibiting competitive bidding by members held to be an unrea-
sonable restraint of interstate trade).
17. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (per cur'am)
(conspiracy to fix an element of price per se unlawful); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975) (price fixing of sale of services held per se unlawful).
The other categories of restraints held to be per se unlawful are vertical price fixing, bid
rigging and market division, certain group boycotts and some tying arrangements. ANTI-
TRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 15, at 22.
18. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 74, at 198 (1977); AN-
TITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 15, at 28-29.
19. 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
20. Id. at 577.
21. Id. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, § 64, at 169.
22. 171 U.S. at 561-65. See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, § 64, at 169.
23. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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porations which controlled eighty-two percent of the pottery market
formed a cartel that fixed prices and limited sales. In holding the cartel
to be a per se unreasonable restraint of trade, Justice Stone stated that
the reasonableness of price fixing agreements need not be considered.
These agreements, he explained, create such potential power that they
"may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful re-
straints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular
price is reasonable or unreasonable."'24
Thirteen years later, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,25
the Court declared that an arrangement whereby major oil producers
agreed to a concerted program entering into the gasoline market to affect
prices was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.26 The
Court expanded its ruling in Trenton Potteries and stated that an arrange-
ment to fix prices could not be justified by the argument that it was
designed to diminish competitive evils.2 7 In reaching its conclusion, the
Court used the "per se" phrase for the first time, and stated that a price
fixing agreement violated section 1 of the Act regardless of whether the
conspirators possessed the market power to affect prices.28
Under the per se analysis, inquiry into the alleged practice is unnec-
essary if two factors have been established. 29 First, a court must con-
clude that the practice almost always causes substantial injury to
competition.3" And second, it must find that an inquiry into the an-
ticompetitive effect of the subject conduct would be unduly time consum-
ing, complex, costly and uncertain.31 Thus, the per se doctrine is
important for a number of reasons:32 It adds certainty to the market-
place by defining practices that are unquestionably unlawful; results in a
high level of deterrence from prohibitive conduct because practices are
kno~'n to be illegal; promotes judicial efficiency by reducing court costs
and litigation costs to the parties; and reduces the possibility that an in-
correct decision, approving conduct that should be condemned, will be
reached.33
24. Id. at 397.
25. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 221-23.
28. Id. at 224 n.59.
29. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, § 70, at 193.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. For a full discussion of the importance of the per se rule, see infra text accompanying
notes 230-38.
33. Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 694-95 (1979).
Dee. 1985]
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The first apparent erosion of the per se rule against horizontal price
fixing occurred in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tems. 34 The Court held that although blanket licensing agreements for
copyrighted music technically constituted price fixing, these agreements
were essential to the survival of the publishing industry35 and in fact cre-
ated a new product.36 The confusion following Broadcast Music was ap-
parently eradicated by the Court's later decision in Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Society,37 where it firmly declared that price fixing is
illegal per se.3s
B. The Rule of Reason
The majority of agreements or acts that restrain trade are not bla-
tantly anticompetitive. Therefore, a more in-depth analysis of the impact
of the restriction is required. This second method of evaluating whether
an agreement is an unreasonable restraint of trade is known as the "rule
of reason."
Five steps are normally used in the application of the rule of reason:
(1) specific identification of the practice involved; (2) determination of
the purpose of the restraint from the evidence presented; (3) identifica-
tion of the likely effects of the challenged practice; (4) identification of
any ways in which the challenged practice will alter competitive interac-
tion; and (5) evaluation of whether the imposed restriction substantially
impedes competition.39
The rule of reason also had its origin in the early cases, such as Joint
Traffic, which confirmed in dictum that certain competitive restraints
must be reasonable.' However, in these early cases, the Supreme Court
saw no need to question the reasonableness of agreements that directly
34. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). For a complete discussion of Broadcast Music, see infra notes 150-
60 and accompanying text.
35. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20. The Court reasoned that the multitude of individual
composers' copyright interests could only be protected through blanket license agreements.
Id. at 19 n.32.
36. Id. at 21-22. The Court explained that a blanket license was a new product because it
offered a product that no individual composer could offer. Id. at 22-23.
37. 457 U.S. 332 (1982); for a discussion of Maricopa County, see infra text accompanying
notes 170-71 & 174.
38. 457 U.S. at 348.
39. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, § 68, at 187-88. Under the rule of reason, the burden of
proving that a particular practice unreasonably restrains trade rests with the plaintiff. Cowley
v. Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751, 754-55 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980)
(plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant manufacturer's restraints placed upon its goods were
unreasonable).
40. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 572 (1898). The Court in Joint
Traffic conceded, for example, that the exercise of the constitutional right to contract limited
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restrained trade.41 Chief Justice White announced what has come to be
known as the rule of reason in the landmark decision of Standard Oil Co.
v. United States.42 There, Standard Oil had acquired the stocks of many
other corporations to aggregate vast capital for the purpose of gaining
perpetual control of the movement of petroleum and its products.43 The
Court used a reasonableness analysis rather than a per se rule because
Standard Oil's actions were not naked agreements among competitors to
restrain trade, but rather involved restraints that were secondary to
otherwise lawful combinations.' Identifying its analysis as the rule of
reason, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling that the
acquisitions by Standard Oil were unreasonable because they were con-
certed efforts to gain monopoly power.45
Despite consistent efforts to broaden the rule of reason, the settled
approach follows the more conservative application of the rule as stated
in Standard Oil.46 Since the Standard Oil decision, the Court has been
tempted to consider social factors that would validate arrangements
otherwise detrimental to competition.47 Litigants have argued that a
challenged arrangement advanced the public interest even though the re-
straint substituted concerted economic regulation for free market compe-
tition.48 These efforts to broaden the rule of reason have been largely
unsuccessful, and the modem conception of the rule identifies the impact
on competition as the sole variable measured in its application.49
competition but was "essential and necessary for carrying out... lawful purposes." Id. See
generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, § 64.
41. See, eg., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). InAddys-
ton, the Court analyzed a price fixing agreement between major producers of iron pipe. Ad-
dressing the argument of the manufacturers that the agreement was reasonable, the Court
stated, "we do not think that at common law there is any question of reasonableness open to
the courts with reference to such a contract." Id. at 238.
42. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
43. Id. at 31-43.
44. Id. at 7. The Court stated that analysis of a challenged restraint's reasonableness was
allowed under the Sherman Act because the previous decisions of the Court that applied and
interpreted the statute were based on reasoned analysis. Id. at 64-65.
45. Id. at 66, 74.
46. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, § 68. According to Professor Sullivan, the Standard Oil
decision announced a "rigorous rule of reason" which made competition the rule of trade. Id.
§ 65, at 172. This rule should not be put aside, despite indications that it may be reasonable to
do so. Id.
47. Id. § 66, at 175.
48. Id.
49. Id. § 68, at 186. In National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 688 (1978), the Court indicated that the rule of reason "does not open up the field of
antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the
realm of reason." The Court also stressed that an inquiry into the reasonableness of a chal-
Dee. 1985]
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When the Supreme Court decided to hear NCAA v. Board of Regents
of the University of Oklahoma, the major controversy surrounding the
rule of reason was what circumstances should implicate its use. Did
Broadcast Music create a broad exception to traditional per se analysis,
or did Maricopa County imply that Broadcast Music stands for a much
narrower principle?
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
A. The NCAA Regulation, Television Plan and
Surrounding Controversy
Since 1905, the NCAA has regulated amateur collegiate sports by
adopting playing rules, standards of amateurism, recruiting regulations,
and rules that govern athletic eligibility and the size of teams and coach-
ing staffs.5 ° Of all the sports played at the collegiate level, only football
has been regulated with respect to television broadcasting.
There are approximately 850 voting member institutions in the
NCAA, which are separated into divisions based on the size and scope of
their athletic programs."1 Division I contains 276 colleges with major
athletic programs. However, only 187 of those participate in intercolle-
giate football. 2 These 187 teams are divided into various conferences
according to geographic location and size of student body. Five major
football conferences in Division I have joined with major football-playing
independent institutions to form the College Football Association
(CFA).53 The purpose behind the formation of the CFA was the promo-
tion of the interests of major football-playing institutions within the
NCAA infrastructure.5 4
lenged restraint "is confined to a consideration of impact on competitive conditions." Id. at
690 (footnote omitted).
50. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2954 (1984). The
NCAA also conducts national tournaments for such sports as basketball, baseball, swimming,
track and wrestling. However, there is no national tournament in the sport of football. Id.
51. Id. at 2954.
52. Id. Divisions II and III are comprised of approximately 500 colleges with less compre-
hensive athletic programs. For purposes of football, Division I has been subdivided into Divi-
sions I-A and I-AA. Id.
53. Id. The CFA includes the Atlantic Coast, Big 8, Southeastern, Southwestern and
Western Athletic conferences. Also included are the following independent colleges or univer-
sities: Notre Dame, Penn. State, Pittsburgh and the service academies. The only major foot-
ball-playing conferences that are not members of the CFA are the Pacific 10 and Big 10
conferences. Membership in the CFA is restricted to football-playing schools meeting certain
standards of size and importance. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F.
Supp. 1276, 1285 (W.D. Okla. 1982), afid, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), afid, 104 S. Ct.
2948 (1984).
54. 546 F. Supp. at 1285. In 1979, CFA members began to advocate that institutions with
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The television rights to intercollegiate football have been controlled
by the NCAA since 1951, when the first television plan was imple-
mented. 5 Until 1977, contracts with the television networks were for
either one or two year terms, but in 1977 the contracts were extended to
four year terms.
The NCAA adopted the television plan at issue in Board of Regents
in 1981 for the 1982 through 1985 football seasons. 6 Like the plans that
preceded it, this agreement was intended to reduce the effects of live tele-
vision upon game attendance.5 7 Additionally, the plan stated that "'all
forms of television of the football games of NCAA member institutions
during the Plan control periods shall be in accordance with this Plan.' "58
Two "carrying networks,"5 9 the American Broadcast Companies
(ABC) and the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), were awarded the
rights to negotiate and contract for football telecasting with members of
the NCAA. Each network was granted the right to telecast fourteen live
"exposures" as described in the plan.6° In return, both networks agreed
major football programs should have a greater voice in the formulation of football television
policy than they were afforded by the NCAA. Subsequently, the CFA investigated the possi-
bility of negotiating its own television agreement and developed its own independent television
plan. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2957. See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
55. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2955. In January of 1951, a three person "Television
Committee" appointed the previous year by the NCAA gave a report on their study of college
football and television. They concluded that television had an adverse effect on college football
and threatened the nation's overall athletic system unless brought under some control. As a
result, the NCAA obtained the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) to study televi-
sion's impact on game attendance and declared a moratorium on televised football games. Id.
at 2954-55. This moratorium was lifted with the implementation of the first NCAA television
plan later that same year. Id. In essence, the basic television plan has not changed in the last
30 years. See infra note 57.
56. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2955.
57. The Television Committee's 1981 briefing book states that:
The plans have remained remarkably similar as to their essential features over the
past 30 years. They have had the following primary objectives and purposes:
1. To reduce, insofar as possible the adverse effects of live television upon
football game attendance and, in turn, upon the athletic and education programs
dependent upon that football attendance;
2. To spread television among as many NCAA member colleges as possi-
ble; and
3. To provide football television to the public to the extent compatible
with the other two objectives.
Id. at 2955 n.4 (quoting NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE
1981 TELEVISION COMMITTEE (1982)).
58. Id. at 2956 (quoting NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF
THE 1981 TELEVISION COMMITTEE (1982)).
59. The "carrying networks" were the companies that were awarded the rights to negoti-
ate and contract with NCAA member institutions for the opportunity to telecast their football
games. Id.
60. Id. The plan also described the rights for a "supplementary series" of telecasts for the
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to pay participating NCAA institutions a minimum aggregate compensa-
tion total of $131,750,000 during the four-year period.61 Although the
television plan authorized each carrying network to negotiate directly
with member schools, the practice that developed over the years involved
the setting of a recommended fee by an NCAA representative for differ-
ent types of telecasts.62 National telecasts commanded the highest price,
followed by regional telecasts and lower division games.63 However, the
amount received by any one team did not change with the size of the
viewing audience, the number of markets reached by the telecast, or the
particular characteristics of the game or the teams. 64 Therefore, the car-
rying networks obtained "the exclusive right to submit a bid at an essen-
tially fixed price to the institutions involved."6
The plan also contained appearance requirements and limitations.
Both ABC and CBS were required to schedule appearances for at least
eighty-two different member institutions during each two-year period the
agreement was in effect.66 No member institution was eligible to appear
on television more than four times nationally, and six times totally, with
the appearances divided equally between ABC and CBS. 67 Additionally,
the television plan contained a limitation on the total number of games
that could be broadcast and a prohibition against selling television rights
not in accord with the plan.6"
Members of the CFA obtained a contract offer from the National
1982 and 1983 seasons along with a procedure for permitting "exception telecasts." Id. Ac-
cording to a separate article of the plan, the supplementary series could consist of no more
than 36 exposures in each of the first two years and no more than 40 exposures in the third and
fourth years. These exposures were to be scheduled at times that did not conflict with Satur-
day afternoon games which made up the principal series. Id. at 2956 n.7 (citing NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOcIATION, REPORT OF THE 1981 TELEVISION COMMITTEE 86-92
(1982)). Exception telecasts were permitted in the home team's market if a game was sold out
and in the visiting team's market if a game was played more than 400 miles from that team's
campus and if the broadcast was not shown in an area where another college football game was
being played. Id. at 2956 n.8 (citing NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, RE-
PORT OF THE 1981 TELEVISION COMMrrEE 62-72 (1982)).
61. Id. at 2956.
62. Id.
63. ABC paid $600,000 for each of its 12 nationally telecast games and $426,779 for each
regional telecast during the 1980 football season. Division I schools received 89.8% of the
total 1980 football television revenue of $27,842,185. Division II received $625,195, or 2% of
the total and the NCAA received $2,147,425, or 6.9% of the total. Id. at 2956 n.10 (citing
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 1981 TELEVISION COM-
MITTEE 251 (1982)).
64. 104 S. Ct. at 2956.
65. Id. at 2956-57 (citing Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1289-93).
66. Id. at 2957.
67. Id. (citing Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1293).
68. Id.
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Broadcasting Company (NBC), which they signed in August of 1981.69
This agreement was more liberal than the NCAA plan and allowed for a
greater number of appearances and increased revenues for CFA mem-
bers.71 Subsequently, the NCAA announced that disciplinary action
would be taken against CFA. members who complied with the NBC
contract.71
B. Procedural History
In response to the NCAA threat of sanctions, the Universities of
Oklahoma and Georgia commenced an action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. 7' The plaintiffs sought
and obtained temporary injunctive relief "preventing [the] NCAA from
initiating disciplinary proceedings or otherwise interfering with CFA's
efforts to complete its agreement with NBC.",73 Despite the entry of the
injunction, the CFA did not ratify the NBC agreement because most
CFA members were unwilling to commit to the contract in the face of
the threatened sanctions.74
69. Id. This contract was signed pursuant to the purposes and goals of the CFA. See
supra note 54 and accompanying text. Additionally, "[t]he members of the CFA had adopted
the position that nothing in the NCAA Constitution or Bylaws empowered NCAA to act as
the exclusive bargaining agent on behalf of all its members for the sale of television rights to
college football games." Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1285. In response to the CFA
activities and before the CFA agreement was signed, the NCAA adopted the following "Offi-
cial Interpretation" of Bylaw 11-3-(aa) on April 18, 1981, which stated in pertinent part:
The [National Collegiate Athletic] Association shall control all forms of televising of
the intercollegiate football games of member institutions during the traditional foot-
ball season .... The terms or principles of the control shall be set forth in a televi-
sion plan . . . prepared by the Football Television Committee, approved by the
NCAA... and approved by at least two-thirds of the members voting .... Any
commitment by a member institution with respect to the televising or cablecasting of
its football games... necessarily would be subject to the terms of the NCAA Foot-
ball Television Plan ....
Id. (quoting the NCAA Official Interpretation of Bylaw 1 1-3-(aa)).
70. 104 S. Ct. at 2957. This contract was ratified at a special meeting of CFA members in
Atlanta on August 21, 1981. Thirty-three members voted in favor of the contract, 20 voted
against and 8 abstained. This vote, however, did not make the contract binding "because CFA
members could still elect to opt out of the contract by written notice to that effect before
September 10 [1981]." Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1286.
71. 104 S. Ct. at 2957. The NCAA also made it clear that the sanctions it intended to
impose on the violative CFA schools were not limited to the football programs, but applied to
other sports programs as well. Id. See also Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1286.
72. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Okla.
1982).
73. Id. at 1286.
74. "On the final extended deadline for CFA members to opt out of the NBC contract, few
CFA members were willing to commit. Consequently, CFA advised NBC that it was unable
to provide an adequate inventory of teams, and the arrangement was terminated." Id.
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Notwithstanding the failure to ratify the CFA agreement, the dis-
trict court held that the NCAA television plan violated the Sherman Act
in three ways: (1) the NCAA had fixed prices for particular telecasts;
(2) the NCAA's exclusive network agreements amounted to a group boy-
cott of all potential broadcasters and its threat of sanctions against mem-
ber institutions constituted a threatened boycott of potential competitors;
and (3) the NCAA's television plan created an artificial limit on produc-
tion of televised intercollegiate football." Thus, the district court found
that the television plan and the network contracts contained price fixing
and group boycott agreements which it considered per se violations of
the Sherman Act.7 6 Additionally, the court analyzed the television plan
under the rule of reason analysis,7 7 and found that the limitations on
price and output were not offset by any procompetitive justification. 8
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed with the lower
court's finding that the NCAA television plan constituted per se illegal
price fixing.7 9 However, the appellate court rejected the boycott holding
of the district court, stating that the plan did not "constitute an attempt
by competitors at one level to foreclose competition by traders at the
same level.""0 This element is crucial and must be present if the alleged
boycott is to be considered illegal per se under the Sherman Act."' Fi-
nally, the court of appeals affirmed the holding of the district court that,
even if the NCAA plan was not illegal per se, it would fail under the rule
of reason analysis.82 The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit
decision.
75. Id. at 1293-96. In the district court, the NCAA offered two principal justifications for
the television plan. First, it claimed that the television policies protected members' gate at-
tendance. Second, the NCAA argued that the plan tended to maintain the competitive balance
among the football programs of the various schools. The district court concluded that the
evidence did not support the first claim. Id. at 1295. Similarly, the second claim was rejected
because the evidence failed to show that other NCAA regulations, such as those applying to
recruitment and the preservation of amateurism, were not sufficient to maintain the competi-
tive balance. Id. at 1295-96.
76. Id. at 1311, 1313.
77. Id. at 1313-19.
78. Id. at 1319.
79. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1156 (10th Cir.
1983).
80. Id. at 1160-61.
81. Id. at 1160 (quoting L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, § 91, at 260). See also L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 18, § 83.
82. 707 F.2d at 1157-60. Thus, the court of appeals held that the NCAA television plan
would not pass muster under the Sherman Act, even if a detailed analysis of the industry was
undertaken. For a discussion of the differences between the per se and rule of reason analyses
and the circumstances under which each is applied, see supra text accompanying notes 16-49.
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IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. The Majority Opinion
In deciding NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma, the Supreme Court focused essentially on two issues. The
threshold issue addressed by the Court was whether to apply the per se
or rule of reason analysis to the NCAA's television plan.8" After decid-
ing to analyze the case under the rule of reason, the Court focused on the
primary issue, the NCAA plan's impact on competition.84
1. Per se test rejected
The Supreme Court concluded that the NCAA television plan con-
stituted horizontal price fixing by creating a minimum aggregate price
which precluded price negotiation between broadcasters and member in-
stitutions.8" The Court also stated that the NCAA had created a hori-
zontal limitation on output by rationing the quantity of televised college
football available.8 6
Although horizontal price fixing and output limitations are usually
"illegal per se,"87 the Supreme Court stated that it was inappropriate to
apply the per se rule to the facts of NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma.88 This decision was not based on judicial inex-
perience in dealing with the NCAA agreement,89 nor on the fact that the
NCAA was a nonprofit entity,90 nor out of respect for the NCAA's role
83. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2959-62 (1984).
84. Id. at 2962.
85. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2959-60 (1984).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2960. The Court stated that horizontal price and output restrictions are gener-
ally anticompetitive and therefore "justify application of the per se rule without inquiry into
the special characteristics of a particular industry." Id. at 2960 n.21. See Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 349-51 (1982) (medical foundation that established doc-
tor's maximum fees for full payment of health services rendered to insured policy holders held
per se unlawful under § 1 of Sherman Act); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978) (engineer association's canon of ethics prohibiting competi-
tive bidding by members held to be a per se violation of § 1 of Sherman Act).
88. 104 S. Ct. at 2960.
89. Id. The Court stated that judicial inexperience with a particular agreement "counsels
against extending" use of the per se doctrine. Id. at 2960 n.21 (citations omitted). However,
when horizontal price and output restrictions are involved, their anticompetitive nature "is
generally sufficient to justify application of the per se rule without inquiry into the special
characteristics of a particular industry." Id. (citing Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 349-51 (1982); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978)).
90. 104 S. Ct. at 2960. Section 1 of the Sherman Act applies equally to nonprofit entities
that engage in anticompetitive conduct. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786
(1975) (state bar prevented from placing restrictions on attorney advertising in newspaper);
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in the encouragement and preservation of intercollegiate amatuer athlet-
ics.91 Rather, the Court considered the critical determining factor to be
that the NCAA plan regulated an industry "in which horizontal re-
straints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at
all." 92
Because of college football's connection to academia, the Court felt
that the uniqueness and integrity of the product could only be preserved
by mutual agreement.93 Thus, the Supreme Court found that the
NCAA's role in the preservation of college football's character could be
viewed as procompetitive.
94
In light of the finding that horizontal restraints were necessary for
product promotion, combined with the possibility that the NCAA's role
in college football was procompetitive, the Supreme Court used a rule of
reason approach to evaluate the challenged television plan.95 The deci-
American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (non-
profit entity civilly liable for agents' antitrust violations committed with apparent authority).
Additionally, the Supreme Court questioned the nonprofit character of the NCAA, based on
the district court's finding that "the NCAA and its member institutions are in fact organized
to maximize revenues." 104 S.. Ct. at 2960 n.22. See also, Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288-89 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
91. 104 S. Ct. at 2960. The Court recognized that the motives of the NCAA would be
accorded a presumption of validity but stated that "good motives will not validate an other-
wise anticompetitive practice." Id. at 2960 n.23 (citations omitted). See generally United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1948) (Sherman Act may be violated even in the
absence of specific intent to restrain or monopolize trade).
92. 104 S. Ct. at 2961. This version of the horizontal restraint doctrine was first articu-
lated by the Court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 444 U.S. 1 (1979).
See infra text accompanying notes 150-56.
93. 104 S. Ct. at 2961. The Court stated that "[a] myriad of rules affecting such matters as
the size of the field, the number of players on a team, and the extent to which physical violence
is to be encouraged or proscribed, all must be agreed upon, and all restrain the manner in
which institutions compete." Id.
Before intercollegiate athletics were controlled by universities in the early twentieth cen-
tury, only limited formal organization was provided, either by students or alumni. Excessive
physical injury to athletes, commercialism and cheating by some participating schools were a
few of the numerous abuses during this period. Comment, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics:
An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655, 656 (1978). These abuses sparked public agitation
that led to the founding of the NCAA in 1905. 2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON OLYMPIC
SPORTS, FINAL REPORT 1975-77, at 332. For a detailed discussion of the history of this early
period of collegiate athletics, see A. FAITH, A HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NA-
TIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND THE AMATEUR ATHLETIC UNION OF
THE UNITED STATES, (1905-1963), at 1-21 (1964).
94. 104 S. Ct. at 2961. The Court stated that the NCAA plays a vital role in preserving
the amateur status of college football which in turn allows this product to be available in its
unique form. As such, the Court acknowledged that the NCAA's "actions widen consumer
choice-not only the choices available to sports fans but also those available to athletes-and
hence [their actions] can be viewed as procompetitive." Id. (footnote omitted).
95. Id. at 2962.
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sion was also based on prior holdings by the Court that: (1) joint selling
agreements may increase efficiency and thus increase the seller's output,
leading to greater competition; 96 and (2) restraints in a limited aspect of a
market may in some cases lead to enhanced nationwide competition. 97
Therefore, the Court concluded that a rule of reason analysis was re-
quired to evaluate whether the NCAA television plan enhanced competi-
tion by increasing the amount of televised games over that which a free
market normally demanded.
2. Television plan unreasonably restrains trade
Applying the rule of reason analysis, the Supreme Court held that
the NCAA's television plan was an unreasonable restraint of trade under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 98 In reaching this conclusion the Court
evaluated the effects of the NCAA's television plan on competition and
rejected arguments that the plan was procompetitive. 99
The Court recognized that because the NCAA television plan re-
strained price and output, it had "a significant potential for anticompeti-
tive effects."" The Court then stated that the anticompetitive nature of
the television plan was realized because if NCAA members were free to
sell their television rights, more college football games would be shown.
However, because member institutions needed NCAA approval in order
to compete in intercollegiate athletics, they had no choice "but to adhere
to the NCAA's television controls."' 1 Thus, by fixing prices and re-
stricting the competitive freedom of its members, the NCAA created a
price structure that was unresponsive to consumer preference and not
related to free market prices.' According to the Court, this resulted in
96. Id. at 2961 (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1,
18-23 (1979)). For a discussion of Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., see
infra text accompanying notes 150-56.
97. Id. at 2961-62 (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-57
(1977)). For a discussion of Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., see infra text ac-
companying notes 140-43.
98. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2954 (1984).
99. Id. at 2962-70.
100. Id. at 2962 (footnote omitted).
101. Id. at 2963 (footnote omitted).
102. Id. See also Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1318
(W.D. Okla. 1982), where the district court declared:
In a competitive market each college fielding a football team would be free to sell the
right to televise its games for whatever price it could get. The prices would vary...
with games between prominent schools drawing a larger price than games between
less prominent schools. Games between the more prominent schools would draw a
larger audience than other games. Advertisers would pay higher rates ... the tele-
caster would then be willing to pay larger rights fees .... Thus, the price which the
telecaster would pay for a particular game would be dependent on the expected size
Dee. 1985]
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artificially higher prices and lower output for college football telecasts.
The Court therefore held that the television plan was anticompetitive and
not consistent with the "consumer welfare prescription" goal of the Sher-
man Act. 103
3. The Court's response to the NCAA's arguments
The NCAA defended its television plan by claiming that the plan
did not have a significant anticompetitive effect. The NCAA argued that
it had no market power and therefore could not alter the "interaction of
supply and demand."' 4 This argument was rejected by the Court for
two reasons. First, the Court explained that even absent a detailed mar-
ket analysis, naked price and output restrictions require some competi-
tive justification as a matter of law. 105 Second, the Court found that the
NCAA did indeed possess market power because of the college football
audience's attractiveness to nationwide advertisers." 6 The Court con-
cluded that college football broadcasts comprise a separate market over
which the NCAA exercised monopoly power. 0 7 Because of this monop-
of the viewing audience. Clearly, the NCAA controls grossly distort the prices actu-
ally paid for an individual game from that to be expected in a free market.
Id.
Earlier in the opinion, the district court gave an example of the distortion created by the
NCAA television plan by referring to a weekend in the fall of 1981 where the Universities of
Oklahoma and Southern California were scheduled to play each other. This game was carried
on more than 200 of ABC's stations due to its importance to the national college football
rankings. Appalachian State and Citadel, two schools not as well-known for their football
programs, also played each other on the same weekend. Only four of ABC's local affiliated
stations carried this game. The district court noted with incredulity that all four teams re-
ceived the same amount of money for their television broadcast rights. Id. at 1291.
103. 104 S. Ct. at 2964.
104. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2965 (1984).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2966. The Court defined market power as "the ability to raise prices above those
that would be charged in a competitive market." Id. at 2965 n.38 (citing Jefferson Parish
Hosp. v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1566 n.16 (1984)).
107. Id. at 2966-67. The Court relied on the findings of the district court that competitors
of the carrying networks could not offer programming that attracted a similar audience. Id. at
2966. Therefore, because of the unique appeal of NCAA football telecasts, "there can be no
doubt that college football constitutes a separate market for which there is no reasonable sub-
stitute." Id. at 2966 n.49. The Court also noted that "'[w]hen a product is controlled by one
interest, without substitutes available in the market, there is monopoly power.'" Id. at 2967
(quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956)).
The finding of monopoly power is then dependent on the definition of the relevant market.
In Board of Regents, the market could be defined from the standpoint of the advertisers, broad-
casters or viewers. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that college football
created a separate market with no reasonable substitutes under any of the three possible mar-
ket definitions. 104 S. Ct. at 2966-67 n.49. This made the NCAA television plan, on its face, a
restraint of free market operation.
Dec.1985] NCAA v. BOARD OF REGENTS
oly power, a heavy burden of proof was placed on the NCAA to establish
an affirmative defense which justified its deviation from free market oper-
ations and satisfied the rule of reason.
10 8
After establishing the NCAA's burden of proof, the Court analyzed
the arguments advanced to justify its television plan.'0 9 The NCAA ar-
gued that its plan was more efficient than the free market, protected live
attendance at games and maintained a competitive balance." 0 The
Supreme Court rejected each of these arguments and concluded that the
NCAA had restricted the place of intercollegiate athletics within society
by curtailing output and restricting the ability of its member institutions
to respond to consumer preference. 1"
The Supreme Court distinguished Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting Systems," 2 which the NCAA relied on as precedent, by
stating that Broadcast Music did not involve the output restraints on
sales that were present in the NCAA's television plan." 3 Relying on the
district court's finding that college football could be marketed as effi-
ciently without the television plan, the Board of Regents Court rejected
the NCAA's argument that the plan was a joint venture with the carry-
ing networks and hence was both procompetitive and more efficient.'
108. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2967. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-96 (1978). In Professional Engineers, the engineer associa-
tion's canon of ethics prohibiting competitive bidding by members was determined to restrain
trade "within the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 693. The Society's affirmative
defense was that the price restraint inured to the public benefit because production of inferior
work was prevented and ethical behavior ensured. Id. at 693-94. The Court, however, stated
that it "has never accepted such an argument." Id. at 694. Therefore, despite valid ethical
considerations claimed by the Society, they did not meet the heavy burden of proof to justify
deviation from free market operations. The Court stated that "petitioner's attempt to...
[justify the price restraint] on the basis of the potential threat that competition poses to the
public safety and the ethics of its profession is nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic
policy of the Sherman Act." Id. at 695.
109. 104 S. Ct. at 2967-70.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2971.
112. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). For a complete discussion of Broadcast Music, see infra text accom-
panying notes 150-56.
113. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2968. In Board of Regents the Court found that pro-
duction (i.e., television broadcasts) had been limited, not enhanced. Id. Conversely, the blan-
ket licenses involved in Broadcast Music enhanced the total volume of music that was sold. Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 150-56.
114. 104 S. Ct. at 2967-68. The Board of Regents case would have had a different outcome
if the "joint venture" rationale advanced by the NCAA had been accepted by the Court. A
joint selling arrangement may be procompetitive in relation to a new product by "reaping
otherwise unattainable efficiencies." Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S.
332, 365 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). See supra note 87. The NCAA relied on Broadcast
Music, see infra notes 150-56, and argued that the television plan was a joint venture. The
Court, however, distinguished Broadcast Music by stating that the blanket licenses involved in
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The Court also explained that the role of the NCAA was to define the
restrictions of the television plan and not to act as a sales agent for its
members.1 5
Protection of live attendance at college football games was another
rationale offered by the NCAA to justify its television plan. 116 The
Court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, it reiterated the
district court's finding that there was no evidence to support the theory
that live attendance would suffer if unlimited television broadcasting was
permitted.'1 7 Second, the Court stated that the NCAA was not protect-
ing attendance to promote amateurism, but instead to prevent potential
competition, a rationale wholly inconsistent with the basic policy of the
Sherman Act. ' 8
Finally, the Court rejected the NCAA's argument that the television
plan helped to maintain a competitive balance among amateur athletic
teams.' 1 9 Although the Court determined that most of the NCAA regu-
latory controls were a justifiable means of fostering competition and en-
hancing public interest, it declared that the restrictions on football
telecasting did not fit into this mold.' 20 It pointed to the fact that no
other NCAA sport employed a similar plan to maintain competitive bal-
that case dealt with rights to a large number of individual compositions, and the availability of
this combined effort package enhanced the total volume of music sold. By contrast, Board of
Regents involved uncombined rights sold on an individual basis in a noncompetitive market.
Since no member institution could televise its football games without restraint, the NCAA
plan also contained a production limitation not present in Broadcast Music. Board of Regents,
104 S. Ct. at 2967-68.
115. 104 S. Ct. at 2967. The NCAA did not act as a selling agent for any member institu-
tion or conference under the television plan. Rather, the NCAA plan simply defined the
number of games to be televised, the basic terms of each contract between the carrying net-
work and the home team, and established the price to be paid for each exposure. Id.
116. Id. at 2968-69.
117. Id. at 2968. The Court stated: "Under the current plan, games are shown on televi-
sion during all hours that college football games are played. The plan simply does not protect
live attendance by ensuring that games will not be shown on television at the same time as live
events." Id. at 2968-69.
118. Id. at 2969. "'Ihe Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assump-
tion that competition itself is unreasonable.'" Id. (quoting National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978)).
119. 104 S. Ct. at 2969-70.
120. Id. at 2969. The Court declared that:
It seems unlikely, for example, that there would have been a greater disparity be-
tween the football prowess of Ohio State University and that of Northwestern Uni-
versity in recent years without the NCAA's television plan. The District Court
found that in fact the NCAA had been strikingly unsuccessful if it has indeed at-
tempted to prevent the emergence of a "power elite" in intercollegiate football.
Id. at 2969 n.62. See also Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276,
1310-11 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
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ance.12' In support of this conclusion, the Court again relied on the
district court's finding that consumption would increase if the television
restrictions were removed. 122 The Court explained that the maintenance
of competitive balance is justified under the rule of reason only if equal
competition maximizes consumer demand for the product. 123 Since the
opposite was true of the television plan, the Court found no legitimate
purpose for the NCAA's controls, and affirmed the decision of the dis-
trict court.
12 4
B. Reasoning of the Dissenting Opinion
In dissent, Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, did not take
issue with the majority's use of the rule of reason analysis. However, the
dissent argued that the NCAA television plan was neither anticompeti-
tive,125 nor invalidated by a rule of reason analysis.126 Justice White con-
cluded that the proper measure of output used to determine the plan's
effect on competition was not the number of televised games, as used by
the majority, but rather the concept of "total viewership."' 127 Using this
concept, the dissent reasoned that the television plan was not
anticompetitive.
128
More importantly, Justice White argued that regardless of the mea-
sure of output used, the NCAA television plan would pass muster under
a rule of reason analysis. 129 The dissent's rule of reason approach dif-
fered from that of the majority in two important respects. First, the dis-
sent would have used a broader definition of the relevant market. 3 '
121. 104 S. Ct. at 2970. See 546 F. Supp. at 1284-85, 1299.
122. 104 S. Ct. at 2970.
123. Id. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-57 (1977).
124. 104 S. Ct. at 2970. The Court relied on the district court's finding that consumption
would increase if the restraints were removed and found this to be a "compelling demonstra-
tion that... [the controls] do not in fact serve any... legitimate purpose." Id. This statement
applied to competition for athletes as well as television viewers. In the absence of the NCAA's
plan, television exposure of all schools would increase. This would naturally increase the ex-
posure of smaller institutions, thereby enhancing their ability to compete for student athletes.
Id. at 2970-71 n.68.
125. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2976 (1984) (White,
I., dissenting).
126. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 2975 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White stated that because the NCAA televi-
sion plan increased national network coverage at the expense of local telecasts, the total televi-
sion audience across the country expanded. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Using this measure of
output, the dissent concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the plan had an "adverse
effect on output and was therefore anticompetitive." Id. (White, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 2976 (White, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 2977 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that if the quality of NCAA
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Second, Justice White advocated consideration of noneconomic factors in
analyzing the validity of the challenged NCAA restraints.1
3 t
V. ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
1. Was the NCAA's television plan essential to the product
of college football?
The Court's rejection of the per se rule against horizontal price fix-
ing in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma was a
startling departure from traditional antitrust analysis. The majority
opinion, written by Justice Stevens, summarily dismissed the idea of us-
ing a per se analysis in a few short paragraphs. 132 The Court stated that
the critical fact that determined the choice of a rule of reason approach
was that college football involved horizontal restraints on competition,
which were essential to its continued availability in the marketplace.
33
In essence, the Court indicated that college football was an activity that
could only be carried out jointly, through the imposition of horizontal
restraints.
What the Court failed to recognize was that the restraints that are
essential to the survival of college football are not antitrust threats at all,
but merely restrictions or rules incidental to the formation of a coopera-
tive league. Some of the football rules, for example those regulating the
size of the field and those controlling violence, have been set by custom.
Other rules, such as those limiting the number of players on a team and
the number of coaches any one team may have, are relatively insignifi-
telecasts deteriorates, or the cost to the viewer rises, many fans would switch to another form
of entertainment. Id. (White, J., dissenting). This "cross elasticity of demand" approach to
market definition has consistently been used by the Court since its decision in United States v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394-96 (1956) (major producer of cellophane
did not have monopoly power in flexible packaging material market). Justice White concluded
that the NCAA plan should be evaluated with respect to its effect on the entertainment market
rather than its effect on the limited market of sports or football. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct.
at 2977 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a
Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare
Model, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1, 34 n.156 (1983)).
131. Id. at 2978-79 (White, J., dissenting). According to Justice White, the fact that the
challenged restraint was placed on a nonprofit educational institution rather than a business
entity was relevant in determining whether the Sherman Act had been violated. Id. at 2978
(White, J., dissenting). In his view, the NCAA television plan insured the preservation of
athletic programs at schools with weaker football teams. Id. at 2979 (White, J., dissenting).
132. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2960-62 (1984).
133. Id. at 2961.
NCAA v. BOARD OF REGENTS
cant restraints on competition.' 34
The guidelines limiting the number of scholarships a school may
award for any one sport arguably are the most troublesome rules with
respect to restraint on competition.135 Yet the Court failed to mention
these rules. However, these guidelines should not be considered horizon-
tal restraints either, because, like the other rules mentioned above, they
are restrictions that are incidental to the maintenance of a viable, com-
petitive league.
The main purpose of NCAA regulation of college football is to pre-
serve a competitive environment. The NCAA maintained that television
broadcast regulation was necessary to promote that end. 136 In this re-
spect, the Board of Regents Court assumed that the NCAA television
plan was essential to bringing the product of college football to the mar-
ket. But the field rules and the broadcast regulations are fundamentally
different. If the television broadcasts were to end, the rules and restric-
tions governing the game and its players would not. 137 Conversely, when
the NCAA broadcast rules and regulations are strictly analyzed with re-
spect to television promotion, they are not essential to competition in
terms of price and output. The Court recognized as much when it held
that competition would increase without the television plan.
2. The Court's use of precedent,
The Court in Board of Regents relied on two of its prior decisions,
Continental T. V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 3 and Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 139 to justify the use of the rule of rea-
son analysis in evaluating the competitive character of the NCAA's tele-
vision plan. Both of these precedents are clearly distinguishable from
Board of Regents.
Continental T. V involved a suit brought by a retailer of television
134. Arguably, even if there were no restraints on the number of players and coaches, a
team with 150 players and 50 coaches could still only play 11 members of that team at a time.
Moreover, this 11 player rule is not a restraint on competition, but a rule established by
custom.
135. Limitations on the number of scholarships allowed for intercollegiate football prevent
wealthy schools from offering an unlimited number of scholarships. However, these limita-
tions are necessary to promote competitive play, which ultimately is more attractive to the
consumer.
136. 104 S. Ct. at 2967-70.
137. Even if this unlikely event were to take place, the rules would remain in place to
promote spectator interest and to coincide with the NCAA's goal of preserving amateur
athletics.
138. 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see infra text accompanying notes 140-44.
139. 441 U.S. 1 (1979); see infra text accompanying notes 150-60.
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sets attacking GTE's plan to restrict the number of retail franchises
granted in a certain area as being unlawful per se under the Sherman
Act. The Court held that analysis of this vertical restriction1" should be
conducted under the rule of reason, not the per se doctrine. 141 In reach-
ing this result, the Court indicated that by using intrabrand vertical re-
strictions, 42 which have the effect of restraining a limited aspect of the
market, manufacturers could compete more effectively with other manu-
facturers. 14 3 Thus, the Court invoked a rule of reason approach to ana-
lyze vertical agreements not dealing with price.
In Board of Regents, therefore, the Court relied in part upon a case
dealing with vertical nonprice restraints to justify application of the rule
of reason to horizontal price fixing. Even though the teaching of Conti-
nental T V is that economic analysis is to be widely used and the per se
approach is to be applied sparingly,1 use of the rule of reason in Board
of Regents was not justified.
The Court's reliance on Continental T V is puzzling given that Con-
tinental T. V expressly reconfirmed that price fixing in the horizontal
context is still a per se violation. 45 Vertical nonprice restraints often
involve procompetitive aspects, 14 6 whereas horizontal price restraints are
140. Continental T V, 433 U.S. at 42-47. Vertical restrictions are applied at different levels
of the market structure, for example restrictions placed on a distributor by its manufacturer.
ANTrrausT LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 15, at 2 n.6.
141. Continental TV., 433 U.S. at 59.
142. The term "intrabrand" refers to the same generic product. In Continental T V, the
generic product involved was television sets. Id. at 52 n.19.
143. Id. at 55.
144. Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemptions,
Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 UCLA L. REv. 265, 322 (1979).
145. Continental T.V, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18. The Court stated that "we are concerned here
only with nonprice vertical restrictions. The per se illegality of price restrictions has been
established firmly for many years and involves significantly different questions of analysis and
policy." Id.
146. Louis, Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures and Licensing Agreements: Do Sealy and
Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and Broadcast Music?, 66 VA. L. REV. 879, 893 (1980). The
Court in Continental T V., for example, noted that vertical nonprice restrictions are"widely
used in our free market economy." 433 U.S. at 57. Furthermore, the Court stated that "there
is substantial scholarly and judicial authority supporting their economic utility." Id. at 57-58.
Vertical nonprice restrictions can be used in a number of procompetitive ways. For exam-
ple, established manufacturers use such restrictions to induce retailers to provide the service
and repair facilities necessary to properly promote their products. Id. at 55. New manufactur-
ers can use these restrictions when entering new markets to induce "aggressive retailers to
make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of
products unknown to the consumer." Id. Thus, by establishing a vertical nonprice restriction,
such as limited regional distributorships, new manufacturers can enter the market and estab-
lished manufacturers can provide services that "might not be provided by retailers in a purely
competitive situation." Id.
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usually "naked"' 47 agreements to restrict competition and are therefore
illegal per se.'48 Additionally, the Board of Regents Court summarily
approved the district court's finding that the NCAA had monopoly
power. 49 This indicates that the Court never really believed that the
NCAA television plan was a restraint in a limited segment of the market,
a fact that had been important to the Court in Continental T. V
Following in the judicial footsteps of Continental T. V came Broad-
cast Music, 0 the second precedent relied upon by the Board of Regents
Court to apply the rule of reason.' 5 ' In Broadcast Music, Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) brought an action under copyright and
antitrust laws against the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), their members and
affiliates. CBS alleged that the issuance of only blanket licenses 5 2 by
ASCAP and BMI to CBS of copyrighted musical compositions was price
fixing per se, a practice that is unlawful under the Sherman Act. 153 The
blanket license fee was the same regardless of the number or type of com-
positions actually played by a licensee.' 54 The Court held that the blan-
ket licenses issued by BMI and ASCAP were not illegal per se under the
Sherman Act because the licenses served to prevent unauthorized use,
eliminated complicated fee schedules and reduced costs. 155 Further-
more, the Court held that the blanket licenses comprised a different
product from that provided by individual composers.'
56
Broadcast Music is clearly distinguishable from Board of Regents.
The Supreme Court itself recognized that, unlike Board of Regents, the
Broadcast Music blanket licenses did not involve limitations placed on
147. A naked restraint is one that has "no purpose except stifling of competition." White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
148. Louis, supra note 146, at 895.
149. 104 S. Ct. at 2966.
150. Broadcast Music was decided two years after Continental T V and further limited the
application of the per se approach. See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
152. Blanket licenses give the licensee the right to perform compositions, owned by others,
as often as the licensee desires for a stated period. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 5.
153. Id. at 4.
154. Id. at 5. The price of the blanket license was either a flat dollar amount, or a percent-
age of the licensee's total revenues. Id.
155. Id. at 19-23. The Court also stated that "[jloint ventures and other cooperative ar-
rangements are also not usually unlawful, at least not as price-fixing schemes, where the agree-
ment on price is necessary to market the product at all." Id. at 23.
156. Id. at 21-23. The Court believed that the value of the blanket license was greater than
the sum of its individual parts. Id. at 21-22. The blanket licenses "allow[ed] the licensee['s]
immediate use of covered compositions, without the delay of prior individual negotiations, and
great flexibility in the choice of musical material." Id. at 22.
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sales volume or individual sales rights to the product.157 Conversely, the
NCAA plan limited both the number of times a member institution
could appear on television and prohibited individual negotiation of
broadcast rights. Furthermore, the blanket licenses in Broadcast Music
increased output and created a new product,' 58 whereas the NCAA plan
did neither, nor did it enable the NCAA to penetrate the market through
an attractive package sale. 5 9 These findings about the NCAA plan were
made in Board of Regents at the appellate court level using a per se
approach.' 6°
Other recent precedents indicate that the Court should have applied
a per se rule to the NCAA television plan. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,16 1 a minimum fee schedule adopted by the Virginia Bar Association
was found to be per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
62
Thus, the per se approach has been applied to nonprofit entities that en-
gaged in horizontal price fixing. Goldfarb was a landmark decision in
that professional associations, once exempted from liability under federal
antitrust laws, now would be subjected to regulation with only limited
exceptions. 163
Like the rules and restrictions pertaining to college football in Board
of Regents, the state bar association in Goldfarb also promulgated certain
restraints to protect the availability of its product.' 64 The bar associa-
tion's fee schedule in Goldfarb operated as a fixed rigid price floor, rather
than an advisory rate.'65 Similarly, the NCAA television plan in Board
of Regents set prices for broadcast rights by establishing a minimum ag-
gregate price to participating member institutions.166 The only difference
between the facts in Board of Regents and the professional association in
157. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2968.
158. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 21-22.
159. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2968.
160. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1156 (10th Cir.
1983).
161. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
162. Id. at 781-83, 793.
163. Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 144, at 308-09; see also Monroe, Trade and Professional
Associations: An Overflow of Horizontal Restraints, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 481, 497 (1984).
The Goldfarb Court did note, however, that "[the public service aspect, and other features of
the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Act in another context, may be treated differently." Goldfarb, 421
U.S. at 788 n.17 (emphasis added). This language however, has provided the professions few
exceptions from antitrust liability. Monroe, supra, at 497.
164. These restrictions consisted of ethical restraints on Virginia Bar Association members
to promote the integrity of the legal profession. 421 U.S. at 789.
165. Id. at 781-83.
166. 104 S. Ct. at 2956.
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Goldfarb is that Board of Regents involved an association regulating am-
ateur collegiate athletics. According to the Court's decision in National
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,'67 this is an insignifi-
cant difference in antitrust analysis. 168
In Professional Engineers, the Supreme Court refused to apply the
rule of reason to analyze the society's canon of ethics that prohibited
competitive bidding by its members. 169 Professional Engineers, like Gold-
farb, is difficult to distinguish from Board of Regents. Both cases in-
volved nonprofit institutions engaged in horizontal price fixing. Like the
restrictions and rules of college football in Board of Regents, the society
in Professional Engineers also promulgated certain horizontal restraints
essential to the continued availability of the product. The code of ethics
restricted the manner in which its members could compete by imposing
ethical considerations upon them and therefore protected the availability
of their product-sound engineering practices to insure public health and
safety. Unlike Board of Regents, however, the Court in Professional En-
gineers applied a per se analysis. This per se approach was later upheld
in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society.'
70
The Court in Maricopa County stated that horizontal maximum
price fixing agreements were still within the realm of condemnation
under the per se rule.' 7 ' Maricopa County adds further justification for
applying the per se analysis to Board of Regents because the fees set by
the NCAA for broadcast rights should come under the per se doctrine.
Even though the NCAA television plan purported to set a minimum ag-
gregate price for member institutions, 72 it also functioned as a price ceil-
ing. The carrying networks had no intention of bidding the price above
the set fee, and the schools could not threaten to sell their right to an-
other network, because to do so would have violated NCAA rules.'7 3
Because both Board of Regents and Maricopa County involved horizontal
167. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
168. According to Professor Sullivan, the Court in Professional Engineers clarified its posi-
tion with regard to professional organizations by stating that professional status had very little
significance in the determination of legal conduct under the antitrust laws. Sullivan & Wiley,
supra note 144, at 309.
169. Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 687-93. The Court stated that "[e]thical norms
may serve to regulate and promote... competition, and thus fall within the Rule of Reason.
But the Society's argument . . . is a far cry from such a position." Id. at 696 (footnote
omitted).
170. 457 U.S. 332 (1982); see infra text accompanying note 171.
171. Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 348.
172. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2956.
173. Id. at 2957 n. 11 (citing Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp.
1276, 1292-93 (W.D. Okla. 1982)).
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price fixing of maximum prices by entities attempting to provide the pub-
lic with a viable product, 7 4 the cases should have been treated in a like
manner. As the Maricopa County Court stated, "[t]he anticompetitive
potential inherent in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial inval-
idation even if procompetitive justifications are offered for some."' 175
Justice Stevens' opinion in Board of Regents is inconsistent with his
approach taken in Professional Engineers and Maricopa County.1 76 First,
in Professional Engineers, Justice Stevens emphatically denied considera-
tion of any argument that unrestrained rivalry does not work well in a
particular commercial context.' 77 Yet this was the basis of the NCAA's
argument in Board of Regents: Unrestrained competition does not pro-
duce good football contests, and there is a necessity to balance the com-
petitive forces of member institutions. 178 Second, in Maricopa County,
Justice Stevens wrote a strident opinion refusing to consider the doctors'
arguments that their organization had social justifications for restraining
competition. 1
79
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice White's dissenting opinion was properly rejected by the ma-
jority for three reasons. First, his "total viewership" measure of out-
put 80 does not necessarily cure the NCAA television plan's
anticompetitive effects. Without the NCAA plan, it is likely that total
viewership would increase. By broadcasting more games of regional in-
terest, negotiated by individual members with local stations, viewership
would eventually increase in each region, thereby increasing total
viewership.
Second, despite Justice White's assertion that the market should in-
clude all entertainment,' 8' an antitrust problem still exists. The NCAA,
as controller of the product, did not allow all competitors for broadcast
174. In Board of Regents, the viable product was amateur intercollegiate football, id. at
2961; in Maricopa County, the viable product was fee-for-service medicine and a competitive
alternative to existing health insurance plans. Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 339.
175. Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 351 (footnote omitted).
176. Baxter, Supreme Court Update-Horizontal Cases, 53 ANTITRUST L. J. 423, 426-27
(1984). Although Professor Baxter stated that he had no quarrel with the Board of Regents
opinion or its outcome, he did acknowledge that a tension exists between Board of Regents and
these other two opinions. Id.
177. Id. at 426.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 427. See supra text accompanying notes 171-75.
180. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2975 (1984) (White,
J., dissenting). See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
181. Id. at 2976 (White, J., dissenting). See supra note 130.
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rights to enter the market, but required that the rights for the entire
NCAA college football season be purchased as a whole. This effectively
excluded all but the largest competitors from the market. Therefore, the
price of the product--exclusive broadcast rights-remained artificially
inflated.
Finally, the dissent's argument that noneconomic factors should be
considered in a reasonableness inquiry"' is an ill-advised departure from
settled antitrust principles. Since the decision in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States,"s3 the Court has been tempted to consider social factors
that would validate arrangements detrimental to competition.'
Justice White in Board of Regents would have the Court invoke this
reasoning to condone conduct that significantly restrained price and out-
put in order to support competing social values. Recognizing that such
volatile political considerations would bring inconsistency to antitrust
analysis, the Court has concluded that the sole consideration in a rule of
reason analysis is the impact on competition. 8 5 Therefore, even though
the Supreme Court has never held that associations of nonprofit educa-
tional institutions have to defend their horizontal restraints solely in
terms of their competitive impact,' 86 this would seem to be the case.
VI. IMPACT OF Board of Regents
A. Economic and Legal Impact on the NCAA
and Member Institutions
A survey of the economic impact of NCAA v. Board of Regents of
the University of Oklahoma on the output and price of college football
182. Id. at 2978 (White, J., dissenting). See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
183. 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (acquisition of stock of many corporations by Standard Oil to aggre-
gate vast capital in order to gain perpetual control of movement of petroleum and its products
held to be an unreasonable restraint of trade). See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
184. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, § 66, at 175.
In Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), the Court rejected the govern-
ment's contention that the Board's rule, which forbade certain purchases of grain after busi-
ness hours, was a § 1 violation. Justice Brandeis' opinion elaborated upon the rule of reason of
Standard Oil by including in the restraint of trade consideration several social factors, such as
the purpose a restriction sought to attain. Id. at 238. In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), coal producers joined to organize the defendant as their exclusive
selling agent and the government challenged this arrangement on the ground that it eliminated
competition. The Supreme Court held that the restraint of trade arrangement was reasonable
considering the economic conditions in the industry which were caused by the Depression. Id.
at 372.
185. National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978). See
also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, § 68, at 186.
186. 104 S. Ct. at 2978 (White, J., dissenting). See Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 696
(considerations that are not related to the effect of the restraint on competition are irrelevant).
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telecasts reveals the extent to which the NCAA television plan had artifi-
cially affected the market. With member institutions of the NCAA able
to negotiate their own contracts, various networks have increased their
coverage of intercollegiate football dramatically. All of the University of
Notre Dame's home games, for example, are telecast on the Turner
Broadcasting, Inc. network. The Entertainment and Sports Program-
ming Network (ESPN), and the USA, CBS and ABC networks carry a
myriad of games on Saturday afternoons. In many instances the pro-
gramming will start early in the morning with games on the east coast
and will end with the west coast games shown during the early eve-
ning.18 7 Also, replays of various college games are shown more fre-
quently to more viewers during the week by the various cable stations.
Despite the increase in coverage, total revenue received by the na-
tion's colleges and universities from broadcasts of college football is less
than that received in 1983.188 Carol Barnes, University of Oklahoma
Accounting Manager, stated that the total television revenues the Uni-
versity received in 1984-85 were $753,000 as compared to $1,000,000 in
1983-84."1 Don Jimmerson, Oklahoma Assistant Athletic Director, felt
that the drop in revenue was not a direct result of the decision, but due to
market saturation, an indirect effect of the ruling.I9 0 Ralph Beaird, Dean
of the University of Georgia Law School, indicated that while the NCAA
television plan produced higher revenues than those received from the
1984-85 football season, the timing of the Board of Regents decision did
not give CFA members adequate time to negotiate their contracts. 191
Dean Beaird also felt that the decision was a positive one for the "have
187. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 1984 NCAA
FOOTBALL TELEVISION COMMITEE, 18 (1985). The Committee stated that:
Most major markets that were wired for cable television received about eight games
each Saturday, while there were probably 15 to 20 games simultaneously being tele-
vised throughout the country. On a typical Saturday in Boston, for example, there
were at least five games in the early time period, two in the late afternoon and one in
the evening.
Id.
188. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 187, at 18. "Had the
NCAA contracts with ABC, CBS and ESPN remained in effect for the 1984 season, they
would have generated $73.6 million. It is estimated that all of the current contracts will gross
less than $50 million." Id.
189. Telephone interview with Carol Barnes, University of Oklahoma Accounting Manager
(Sept. 19, 1985) (synopsis of interview on file at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
190. Telephone interview with Don Jimmerson, University of Oklahoma Assistant Athletic
Director (Sept. 1985) (synopsis of interview on file at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
191. Telephone interview with Ralph Beaird, Dean of the University of Georgia Law
School (Sept. 20, 1985) (synopsis of interview on file at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
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not" schools.192 He explained that many colleges with regional or local
followings were never chosen by the NCAA or the national networks to
be on television. Now, as a result of Board of Regents, these colleges will
appear on television, establish a closer relationship to their alumni and
hopefully build up contributions to academic programs.
193
The Pacific 10 Conference has also felt the economic impact from
Board of Regents. Michael McGee, Athletic Director at the University
of Southern California (USC), indicated that television revenues are now
less certain. 94 Under the former NCAA television plan, revenues were
set in advance and the whole package worked "like clockwork." 1 95 Now,
the supply of college football broadcasts is no longer controlled and ad-
vertising prices are reduced, which makes revenues from individually ne-
gotiated contracts less certain. Thus, with football schedules set ten
years in advance, and broadcast rights contracts lasting only two years in
duration, a risk cushion must be incorporated into the long-range foot-
ball budget.1 96 According to McGee, appearance fees for nationally tele-
vised games have dropped significantly.1 97 Although a school may make
up for lost fees with more national television appearances, it ultimately
loses because gate receipts are affected. This also occurs because the col-
lege football fan now has more incentive to stay home and watch the
large number of games broadcast on television rather than to purchase
the season tickets of his favorite college team.198
Glen Toth, Director of Marketing at the University of California,
Los Angeles (UCLA), indicated that UCLA's fiscal 1984-85 football
budget, projected to be balanced before the Board of Regents ruling, had
a deficit of $1,100,000.99 He felt that the decision put the national net-
works in the "driver's seat" and put the "squeeze" on syndication com-
panies who marketed local broadcast rights. Toth stated that the
national networks, who are no longer regulated by the NCAA minimum
fee agreement, can purchase broadcast rights virtually on a take it or
leave it basis. For example, the revenue UCLA was to receive from the
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Telephone interview with Michael McGee, University of Southern California Athletic
Director (Aug. 12, 1985) (synopsis of interview on file at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Telephone interview with Glen Toth, University of California, Los Angeles Director of
Marketing (Sept. 1985) (synopsis of interview on file at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
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national telecast of its game with Nebraska was $1,200,000. After the
Board of Regents decision, however, UCLA received only $700,000."2
Conversely, Toth explained, because of market saturation and lower
advertising prices for national games, local advertising has become less
appealing to the advertiser. Syndication companies which market the
school's local or regional television broadcast rights are put in a financial
bind. For example, Metro Sports, Inc. contracted with UCLA for its
local television and radio broadcast rights for a flat fee of $800,000 per
year.201 After Board of Regents and the subsequent reduction in national
television advertising prices, Metro Sports could not make enough
money selling its advertising spots and thus defaulted on the contract
with UCLA. Because Metro Sports also had contracted with the Pacific
10 Conference to acquire the syndication rights to basketball, it defaulted
on that contract as well.2°2
The resulting economic impact of Board of Regents may lead to a
revised NCAA television plan that would pass muster under the Sher-
man Act. In fact, the NCAA has already attempted to amend the plan.
However, at a joint meeting of both the Division I-A and II-A schools on
July 10, 1984, the amended plan was not ratified. 0 3 Ultimately, the
NCAA, like professional associations, may have to learn to live with the
results of competition.
As a result of the Board of Regents decision, members of the CFA
signed their own agreement with ABC and ESPN for broadcast rights to
the 1984 college football season.2 ' The Pacific 10 and the Big 10 confer-
ences, which are not members of the CFA, jointly entered into a one-year
agreement with CBS for network television coverage.2 05 Additionally,
the individual conferences, both CFA and non-CFA, have signed in-
dependent contracts with sports syndication networks. These contracts
allow the syndication network to televise conference games not shown
nationally.
A legal problem arises when different conferences, for example the
Pacific 10 and the Big 8, play each other: Which network has the televi-
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 187, at 7. Division I-A
defeated the amended plan by a vote of 66 opposed, 44 in favor. Since the plan required the
majority approval of both the Division I-A and II-A members voting separately and voting
jointly, the plan was not submitted for a combined vote.
204. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 747 F.2d 511, 513-14 (9th
Cir. 1984).
205. Id. at 513.
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sion rights to the game? This dispute recently came to a head when USC
and UCLA were to play the University of Notre Dame and the Univer-
sity of Nebraska, respectively. 06 Both USC and UCLA are Pacific 10
Conference schools whose broadcast rights belong to CBS. 07 Notre
Dame and Nebraska are CFA schools whose broadcast rights belong to
ABC.208 The CBS contract contained a provision which stated that in
the event of an interconference game, the CBS broadcast contract con-
trolled.20 9 The ABC contract contained a similar crossover provision.210
Therefore, ABC did not want to allow CBS to broadcast the Notre
Dame at USC or the Nebraska at UCLA games and attempted to pre-
vent CBS coverage of the games through enforcement of the CFA cross-
over restrictions."' Subsequently, USC and UCLA sued ABC for the
right to broadcast. Justice Ferguson of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction granted by the district
court. The injunction barred ABC from refusing to allow CBS to broad-
cast the two games in question.21 2
The principal complaint of the plaintiffs and the premise behind the
district court's preliminary injunction was that the ABC-CFA contract
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.21 3 Neither the district court, nor
the court of appeals reached any final conclusions regarding the merits of
the plaintiffs' contention.214
After reviewing Board of Regents, the court distinguished the re-
strictions involved in the NCAA television plan with those in the ABC-
CFA contract.215 The Ninth Circuit found that the NCAA's important
role, as the guardian and protector of amateurism, was not transferable
to the CFA.216 This belief was based on the court's findings that the
ABC-CFA contract had no relationship to the quality and character of
college football.217 The essential ingredients of product integrity and in-
dustry uniformity were still found to be maintained by one entity-the
206. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 747 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.
1984).
207. Id. at 513.
208. Id. at 512-13.
209. Id. at 514.
210. Id. at 513.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 521-22.
213. Id. at 514-15.
214. Id. at 515-16.
215. Id. at 517-18.
216. Id. at 517.
217. Id.
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NCAA.218 The Ninth Circuit concluded that a per se approach to the
ABC-CFA agreement was appropriate.
219
B. Legal Impact on Per Se Analysis: A Suggested Standard
The Supreme Court's opinion in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma leaves antitrust analysis in a state of confusion.
In the past, the Court has blurred the distinctions between the per se and
the rule of reason approaches; this decision further erodes those distinc-
tions.220 The Court's failure to recognize that it had applied an enhanced
per se analysis221 in Board of Regents, gives little guidance to lower
courts in deciding difficult characterization problems. The decision also
makes it easier for defendants to invoke the rule of reason unnecessarily.
This Note proposes an enhanced per se approach that comports with the
spirit of Broadcast Music and Board of Regents without inviting the total
erosion of per se theory.
Under the per se doctrine, some form of "preliminary analysis.., is
always necessary prior to characterizing conduct as price fixing.
'222
When this characterization is difficult, the per se standard entails some-
thing more than the simple yes/no answer as to whether an alleged price
agreement is found to be anticompetitive.223 Where, as in Board of Re-
gents, the Court elaborates on this characterization process without un-
dertaking a burdensome rule of reason analysis, a third level of antitrust
inquiry is constructed.224 Professor Sullivan identifies this analysis as
"the analytically enhanced" per se approach.225
In Board of Regents, the Court applied this approach. Professor
Sullivan stated that a court using enhanced per se analysis weighs the
values of competitive injury versus competitive benefit as it would under
the rule of reason, but narrows the scope of inquiry.226 This analysis
focuses on the court's familiarity with the suspect practice and the possi-
bility that the court can make an early, reliable judgment concerning net
competitive effect.227 In Board of Regents the Court noted that it had
218. Id.
219. Id. The court did not apply the per se analysis because it found that the trial court had
not abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.
220. The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. Rv. 87, 255-56 (1984).
221. See infra text accompanying notes 222-27.
222. Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 144, at 332.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 332-33.
225. Id. at 332.
226. Id. at 332-33.
227. Id. at 333.
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judicial familiarity with price-fixing agreements, like the NCAA's, which
involved nonprofit entities.228 It also implied that an early judgment re-
garding the net competitive effect would be reliable, because the televi-
sion plan's anticom'petitive effects and consequences were apparent.229
By failing to identify that it actually had applied the analytically en-
hanced per se approach, the Board of Regents Court failed to explore the
doctrine's limitations.
Identification of this heightened per se approach would help reestab-
lish the distinctions between the per se and rule of reason theories and
preserve the advantages of the per se rule.
Left unexplained, Board of Regents will limit application of the per
se rule and lead to less predictability in the marketplace, less deterrence
from antitrust violations, increased costs to courts and litigants and
greater risk of incorrect decisions.230 The per se rule's most significant
advantage is predictability. 231 In the complex world of business decision
making, it is important for business executives, and the lawyers who
counsel them, to know what activity is allowed under the antitrust laws.
The per se rule removes much of the speculation about how the trier of
fact will view the nature and effect of a proposed activity.232
The per se approach also results in a higher level of deterrence.
When conduct is known to be absolutely prohibited, a company or or-
ganization will hesitate to engage in activity that remotely resembles that
conduct.233 Additionally, borderline conduct which should be deterred,
but which might go unchallenged for some time, would less likely be
undertaken.234 Because the rule of reason permits a defendant to show
that his conduct is ultimately procompetitive, Board of Regents may en-
courage firms to engage in conduct that resembles traditional horizontal
restraints on price and output.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs cost of establishing the illegality of par-
ticular conduct is much greater under a rule of reason approach. 235 The
trier of fact will have to admit and analyze a substantial quantity of evi-
228. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2960 &n.22 (1984).
229. Id. at 2963.
230. Bauer, supra note 33, at 694-95. Professor Bauer identified the advantages of the per se
approach in his analysis of the per se rule and concerted refusals to deal. However, his article
did not discuss horizontal price fixing restraints like those contained in Board of Regents.
231. Id. at 694.
232. Id. at 694-95.
233. Id. at 695.
234. Id.
235. Id. The plaintiff, whether an individual or an administrative agency, will have to go to
great trouble and expense to amass evidence relating the history, nature and purpose of the
alleged activity. Id.
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dence, thus expending more of the court's time.2 36 This result seems par-
ticularly inappropriate considering the traditional characterization of
horizontal price and output restraints, like those in Board of Regents, as a
naked restraint on competition.
Use of the per se approach also reduces the possibility that a judge
or a jury will approve conduct that should have been condemned.237
This seems to be especially true in cases, such as Board of Regents, that
involve maximum price agreements.2 38 Thus, Board of Regents may be
creating dangerous precedent in that other horizontal price restraint
cases may be wrongly decided using a rule of reason approach rather
than a per se rule.
The Board of Regents decision has been notably cited in two opin-
ions. In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary and
Printing Co.,239 a wholesale office supply purchasing cooperative expelled
a member of the group without explanation, notice or hearing. The ex-
pelled member brought suit against the cooperative alleging that the ex-
pulsion without procedural safeguards was a group boycott and a per se
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.2" The Supreme Court dis-
agreed and cited Board of Regents for the proposition that the per se
approach should be used only "'when surrounding circumstances make
the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified
further examination of the challenged conduct.' "241 The Court held that
arbitrary exclusion from a wholesale purchasing cooperative is not pre-
sumptively unreasonable.242 Hence, following the lead of Board of Re-
gents, the Court substantially weakened the per se approach to group
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. The United States, in its amicus curiae brief in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), stated that:
[J]udicial inquiry into the effect on prices of maximum price agreements would be
virtually impossible as a practical matter, for it would force antitrust courts to im-
merse themselves in voluminous price and output data without ascertainable stan-
dards for analysis. They would have to make the kind of judgments that rate
regulating agencies make, but without statutory guidance, rulemaking power, or spe-
cialized expertise and staff.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 17 (footnote omitted), Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), cited in Note, Antitrust-Agreements Among
Competing Physicians Establishing Maximum Fee Schedules for Their Services Are Per Se Vio.
lations of the Sherman Act, 57 TUL. L. Rnv. 994, 1008 n.69 (1983).
239. 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985).
240. Id. at 2614. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1963)
(rule of reason appropriate only where cooperative had provided procedural safeguards suffi-
cient to prevent arbitrary expulsion).
241. Id. at 2617 (quoting Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2968).
242. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 105 S. Ct. at 2620.
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boycotts. 243
Conversely, in United States v. Capital Service, Inc.,' 4 various mo-
tion picture exhibitors agreed to split or allocate motion picture rights for
films released by distribution companies. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that Board of Regents did not preclude application
of the per se rule because the challenged conduct was not essential to the
survival of the industry. 45
It is foreseeable that defendants, especially lawful associations, will
use the Board of Regents decision to attempt to erode other traditional
per se categories, such as vertical price fixing, bid rigging, market divi-
sion and tying arrangements. Anytime a challenged restraint is remotely
essential to an industry's survival, or has some connection to the eco-
nomic availability of a product, a defendant will argue for a rule of rea-
son analysis. To be sure, the Board of Regents Court ignored this
possibility when it used protection of amateurism as a reason to reject the
per se rule, even though it held that the amateurism issue was irrelevant
under the rule of reason. In addition, lower courts may be reluctant to
apply a per se analysis if they read Board of Regents as signifying a gen-
eral trend away from labeling antitrust violations without further
inquiry.
In Board of Regents, the Court failed to recognize that Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems implies that the challenged
restraint, without more, must be essential to the survival of an industry
or the creation of a new product in order to reject application of the per
se rule.246 The enhanced per se rule is best suited to make this determi-
nation. If a defendant fails to prove that the challenged conduct is essen-
tial to one of these purposes, traditional per se analysis should be strictly
applied. If the defendant prevails on this issue, courts should then apply
a rule of reason analysis with a presumption that the conduct is procom-
petitive. A court need not relitigate this issue, which should eliminate
the need for an expansive trial under the rule of reason.
VII. CONCLUSION
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, the
243. The Court, however, did not challenge the validity of Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), and its progeny because these cases involved direct efforts to
deny, persuade, or coerce suppliers or customers into not dealing with competitors. Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, 105 S. Ct. at 2619.
244. 756 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1985).
245. Id. at 506 n.1. The district court also cited Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
cast Systems, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), and applied a similar distinguishing rational. Id.
246. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify the proper application of
the per se rule in antitrust analysis. The Court applied an analytically
enhanced per se approach but failed to recognize it as such. This further
blurred the distinctions between the per se and rule of reason doctrines.
In a traditional per se case, when a defendant claims that his actions are
essential to the creation of a new product or the survival of an industry,
courts should apply an enhanced per se analysis. Unless the challenged
conduct, by itself, is essential to either of these purposes, traditional per
se analysis should control. This approach retains the benefits of the per
se doctrine without forbidding those restraints that are truly essential.
James S. Arico
